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On the author 
Emer de Vattel was born in Couvet (25 April 1714) and died in Neuchâtel, less than thirty kilometres 
further,  fifty-three years later (20 December 1767). Son of a reformed pastor, he studied theology at 
Basel (1728-1732) and philosophy at Geneva (1733), where he got acquainted with the ideas of 
Burlamaqui, Leibniz and Wolff. From 1747 on, he acted as an agent for Augustus III, Elector of Saxony 
and King of Poland. In the beginning of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), having lost hopes of an 
academic position, he wrote Le droit des gens, which gained him an appointment as a pricy councillor 
at Dresden.  
Vattel’s personal preferences run through Le droit des gens: “I was born in a country where Liberty 
has been the heart, treasure and most fundamental law” (Book I, § 27).  Tossed around between 
France and Brandenburg-Prussia, his fellow countrymen’s independence could count as an example 
of state equality, where even the seemingly most insignificant dwarf rose to the shoulders of giants. 
Likewise, minor states entering into treaties of protection with more powerful players were 
repeatedly asserted not to lose their sovereignty (Book I, § 192; Book II, § 155).  Vattel overtly 
affirmed his convictions as a Protestant, and ridiculed Catholic doctrine, clergy and institutions.  
On the book 
Le droit des gens consists of five parts. Principles of the Law of Nature (Preliminary part) guide the 
reader through matters of both internal public law (Book  I) and the  law of nations (Book II: the 
Nation considered in its relations towards others; Book III: War; Book IV: the Reestablishment of 
Peace, Embassies).  
On one hand, mirroring private and public international law, his work followed Grotius’ structure in 
De iure belli ac pacis libri tres. Sovereignty and independence did not exclude reciprocal duties: men 
were not self-sufficient by nature. The goal of Natural Law was shared happiness, the ultimate motor 
of human behaviour (Book I, §110). States were deemed to cultivate their friendship, and 
demonstrate their mutual love by practical acts of assistance (Book II, §11). Internal rules, imposed 
on conscience by moral imperatives, had priority over obligations created by the subjects themselves 
(voluntary law of nations). Specific rules applying to bilateral relations were covered by the arbitrary 
law of nations, equally subjected to the Law of Nature. The tree categories of positive law of nations 
(arbitrary, voluntary and customary law) generated external obligations of two kinds, perfect 
(enforceable) and imperfect (non-enforceable). For instance, exercising a perfect, internal Natural 
right to gather abroad anything missing within its own boundaries, a State was unable to force a 
vendor to sell, since the right to buy commodities was but an imperfect one (Book I, § 91).   
On the other hand, the conduct of Nations or Sovereigns was set apart from the general Law of 
Nature: although rules were universal, their application took place between and not within Societies. 
The primary obligation of self-preservation dominated. Any Nation violating the laws of the inter-
state Society was entitled to use force to guarantee its continuity.  Yet, it could not judge its equals: 
only the violation of its own security, as in the case of justified self-defence (Book II, § 66), could lead 
to the use of armed force (Book II, §7; § 70). Le droit des gens is often seen as a translation of Wolff’s 
works in Latin. Yet, Vattel discarded the idea of community or Civitas Maxima, which could impose 
rules on its members.  
The terms Nation, State and Fatherland (Book I, § 122) carried his preference over Sovereign or 
Ruler. States were political societies wherein naturally free and independent subjects retained most 
attributions (General Principles, §1). Sovereign authority could only be established for the common 
good. Legitimacy was delegated by this Corpus of the Nation to a temporary “Conductor”, who was a 
mere administrator (Book I, § 260) and in no way the absolute master. The Sovereign only 
represented the Nation (Book II, § 38). He could not encroach on the independence of integer and 
enlightened judges. Princes were both incapable to study legal cases and to sentence (Book I, § 163). 
When a ruler overturned a judgment, he was bound to refer it to another jurisdiction, and could not 
take over the judge’s role (Book I, § 165). Only the executive power naturally belonged to the 
Sovereign (Book I, § 162).  
Fundamental laws, guaranteeing individual liberty, delimited a ruler’s external perimeter of action 
(Book I, § 29). Consequently, sovereigns could not cede any Province, City or subject, unless necessity 
or strong motives of public interest pressed them to do so (Book I, § 17). Only the Nation itself could 
change succession rules or partition its territory (Book I, § 66), although  these questions were often 
settled by foreign powers in international agreements. Alienations out of necessity had to remain 
valid, a consequence of the classical definition of ownership, inconceivable without the ability to 
alienate (Book I, § 262).  A Nation had to conserve and perfect itself, enabling its citizens to procure 
whatever was necessary for the commodity and pleasures of life, as well as their happiness (Book I, § 
15, § 264). In order to ensure demographic continuity, Vattel agreed in principle to the abduction of 
women from neighbouring Nations (Book II, §122). 
State behaviour was built on private law-analogies. In principle, only occupation of free territories 
constituted a valid title for state ownership. Yet, as the Americas were concerned, Vattel saw no 
problem in European expansion. Native non-sedentary savage tribes could not claim more than they 
strictly needed to exploit and cultivate (Book I, §209; Book II, § 97). No Nation could aggrandize itself 
to the detriment of another, just as private persons were not allowed to benefit from unjustified 
enrichment (Book I, § 184).  State sovereignty consisted of imperium and dominium eminens, or the 
faculty to dispose of all goods, based on the original appropriation of all goods by the nation. Citizens 
only exercised dominium utile, or limited ownership of their goods (Book II, § 83).  
State consent was at the basis of most norms in the positive law of nations. Perfidy was the worst of 
insults amongst sovereigns in a system where the faith of treaties formed the core of the normative 
order (Book II, § 163 and § 221). Vattel, however, was not consequent in his consensualism. At 
various moments across his work, the absence of a just cause formed a check on contractual liberty. 
Yet, in absence of a competent judge over princes, the parties themselves –or, occasionally, 
mediators (Book II, § 328), arbiters (Book II, § 329) or guarantors (Book II, §§ 236-239)- determined 
the legitimacy of their acts. Decisions were subject to unilateral assessment, which rendered Vattel’s 
system arbitrary and non-committal. He legitimated the prevailing balance of power-politics in 
international relations. If a Nation built up military capabilities, appearances would determine if the 
others could find a just cause for war (Book III, § 40).  Pragmatism and reliance on aphorisms 
hampered coherence and enforceability. Sanctions for the unnecessary use of violence were either 
political, or a matter of conscience (Book III, § 24). Moreover, even if it was impossible for both 
contenders to wage war with a just cause, they could both be seen to act in good faith.  
Vattel’s immediate success with contemporaries was real. First published in Neuchâtel (1757), 
London and Leiden (1758) in two volumes, the book was re-edited 9 times in the 18th and 11 times in 
the 19th century, even before the standard edition in the Classics of International Law series 
(Washington, 1916). In the 19th century alone, Le droit des gens was translated 23 times in English, 6 
times in Spanish, and also in German and in Italian. The young Republic of the United States took 
inspiration from Vattel’s numerous arguments on problems of international life. In the nineteenth 
century, endorsed by the Founding Fathers, Vattel’s synthesis of European inter-state law became a 
reference for US diplomacy and in the Supreme Court. Yet, doctrine criticized the inconsistency and 
abundance of superficially argued maxims. As a “classic of international law”, Le droit des gens 
remains controversial. 
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